1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 10 No. ED CR-18-00250-CJC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) REGARDING SEVERANCE; (2) CONTINUING TRIAL DATE AND FINDINGS REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS 12 v. PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FOR 13 AURELIO PATINO, DEFENDANTS PATINO, RUIZ, AND aka "Augie," VILLEGAS; AND (3) ADVANCING TRIAL DATE FOR DEFENDANT REYES 14 ADILSON REYES, aka "Shanky," 15 CHRISTOPHER RUIZ, aka "Sneaky," and 16 JOSE VILLEGAS, aka "Torch," 17 Defendants. 18 19 The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Regarding (1)

The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Regarding (1) Severance; (2) Request for Continuance of Trial Date and Findings of Excludable Time Periods Pursuant to Speedy Trial Act for Defendants Patino, Ruiz, and Villegas; and (3) Request for Advancement of Trial Date for Defendant Reyes ("the Stipulation"), filed by the parties in this matter on February 18, 2020.

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For the reasons stated in the Stipulation, it is ordered that the trial of defendant ADILSON REYES is hereby severed from that of the remaining defendants in this case. The trial date for defendant REYES is advanced to August 4, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., and the pretrial

conference for defendant REYES is advanced to July 20, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.

The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates: facts that support a continuance of the trial date for defendants AURELIO PATINO, CHRISTOPHER RUIZ, and JOSE VILLEGAS in this matter, and provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

The Court further finds that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

## THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN:

- 1. The trial in this matter, for defendants PATINO, RUIZ, and VILLEGAS, is continued from September 1, 2020, to January 26, 2021, at 8:30 a.m. The pretrial conference for defendants PATINO, RUIZ, and VILLEGAS is continued to January 11, 2021, at 9:00 a.m.
- 2. For defendants PATINO, RUIZ, and VILLEGAS, the time period of September 1, 2020, to January 26, 2021, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to  $18 \text{ U.S.C. } \S\S 3161(h)(7)(A)$ , (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(iv).
- 3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time

periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence. IT IS SO ORDERED. February 20, 2020 DATE HONORABLE CORMAC J. CARNEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Presented by: /s/ GREGORY S. SCALLY Assistant United States Attorney